

• A linear congruential generator produces a sequence of integers x_i for i = 1, 2, ... starting with the given initial (seed) value x_0 as

$$x_{i+1} = a \cdot x_i + b \pmod{n}$$

where the multiplication and addition operation is performed modulo n, and therefore, $x_i \in \mathcal{Z}_n$

- This is a deterministic algorithm; the same x_i value will always produce the same x_{i+1} value, and the same seed x_0 will produce the same sequence x_1, x_2, \ldots
- There are only finitely many $x_i \in \mathcal{Z}_n$, and the sequence will repeat
- The period of the sequence is w such that $x_{i+w} = x_i$ for any $i \ge 0$

- For (a, b, n, x₀) = (3, 4, 15, 1), i.e., a = 3, b = 4, 15, and x₀ = 1, we obtain the sequence: 1,7,10,4,1,7,10,4...
 The period is w = 4
- For $(a, b, n, x_0) = (3, 4, 15, 2)$, we obtain the sequence: 2, 10, 4, 1, 7, 10, 4, 1, 7, . . . The period is w = 4



- For $(a, b, n, x_0) = (3, 4, 17, 1)$, we obtain the sequence: 1,7,8,11,3,13,9,14,12,6,5,2,10,0,4,16,1,7,8... The period is w = 16
- For (a, b, n) = (2, 4, 17), and x₀ = 2, we obtain the sequence: 1, 6, 16, 2, 8, 3, 10, 7, 1, 6, 16, 2, ... The period is w = 8



Period of LCGs

Theorem

Given a LCG with parameters (a, b, p) such that p is prime, the period w is equal to the order of the element a in the multiplicative group \mathcal{Z}_p^* for all x_0 seed values, except the period is 1 if $x_0 = -(a-1)^{-1} \cdot b \mod p$.

- The group order is p-1
- The period w is a divisor of p-1
- The order of a primitive element is p-1
- The maximum period w = p 1 occurs when a is a primitive
- The theorem states that, if the starting point is

$$x_0 = -(a-1)^{-1} \cdot b \mod p$$

then the period is w = 1

• This is called "bad seed" since it causes minimum period w = 1

Bad Seed

- Assume $x_0 = -(a-1)^{-1} \cdot b \pmod{p}$
- Write this as $x_0 = ub \pmod{p}$ where $u = -(a-1)^{-1} \pmod{p}$
- This implies $u \cdot (a-1) = -1$, and thus, au = u 1
- By starting with $x_0 = ub$, we obtain

$$\begin{array}{rcl} x_0 &=& ub \pmod{p} \\ x_1 &=& ax_0+b \pmod{p} \\ &=& aub+b \pmod{p} \\ &=& (au+1)b \pmod{p} \\ &=& (u-1+1)b \pmod{p} \\ &=& ub \end{array}$$

- Therefore, all subsequent x_i s will be equal to ub
- The period w = 1

Period of LCGs

- For (a, b, n) = (3, 4, 17), the order of the group is equal 16
- The element a = 3 is primitive since

 $\{3^1, 3^2, 3^3, \dots, 3^{16}\} = \{3, 9, 10, 13, 5, 15, 11, 16, 14, 8, 7, 4, 12, 2, 6, 1\}$

• The bad seed value is

$$x_0 = -(a-1)^{-1} \cdot b \pmod{17}$$

= -(3-1)^{-1} \cdot 4 \pmod{17}
= -2⁻¹ \cdot 4 \left(mod 17)
= 15 \left(mod 17)

- When $x_0 = 15$, we obtain the sequence: 15, 15, 15, ...
- When $x_0 = 15$, the period is w = 1

The LCG for $(a, b, n, x_0) = (5, 0, 47, 1)$

- If we select b = 0, the bad seed value for any n will always be $x_0 = -(a-1)^{-1} \cdot b = 0 \pmod{n}$ for any a or n
- Therefore, it would be easy to detect and avoid the bad seed 0
- For example, for $(a, b, n, x_0) = (5, 0, 47, 1)$, we obtain the maximal period since 5 is a primitive root mod 47, and the bad seed is automatically avoided for a nonzero x_0



A Practical LCG

- Since our processors have fixed data length, it is a good idea to select a prime as large as the word size, since we will perform mod *p* arithmetic
- It turns out that $2^{31} 1 = 2, 147, 483, 647$ is a prime number; furthermore, a suitable primitive element in \mathcal{Z}_p for $p = 2^{31} - 1$ is found as $a = 7^5 = 16,807$
- The primitive root *a* is chosen to be near the square root of *p*, therefore, we have a good, practical, general-purpose LCG, given as

$$x_{i+1} = a \cdot x_i \pmod{p}$$

$$p = 2^{31} - 1 = 2,147,483,647$$

$$a = 7^5 = 16,807$$

Since *a* is a primitive element, the period of LCG is $w = 2^{31} - 2$

Cryptographic Strength of LCGs

- Does the LCG satisfy requirements R1 and R2?
- Analysis and experiments show that LCGs with large *p* (such as the previous practical LCG) are (almost) acceptable as statistically random, but there are some deficiencies
- Unfortunately, the LCGs do not satisfy R2 since they are is highly predictable: Assuming a and p are known, given a single element x_i, any future element of the sequence can be computed as x_{i+k} = a^kx_i mod n
- Similarly, given x_i , any past element of the sequence can be computed as $x_{i-k} = a^{-k}x_i = (a^{-1})^k \mod n$
- Inversion: the seed x₀ can be computed if any element x_i of the sequence is known, by working back from i down to 0

Cryptographic Strength of LCGs

- In general, we need to assume that a and p are fixed parameters of the RNG and therefore they are not changeable, i.e., they are not part of the key (x₀, the seed) — they can be discovered by reverse engineering
- If we can bundle a and p with the seed x₀, then we can claim more security it would be much harder to discover the key (a, p, and x₀) given a limited number of elements x_i from the sequence x₁, x₂,...
- Note that x_{i+1} = a ⋅ x_i mod p implies x_{i+1} = a ⋅ x_i + N ⋅ p for some integer N; however, N is different for every pair (x_{i+1}, x_i), we have

$$x_{i+1} = a \cdot x_i + N_i \cdot p$$

and therefore, if we have k pairs of the known elements (x_j, x_k) then we will also have k + 2 unknowns, i.e., a, p, and N_i for i = 1, 2, ..., k

Cryptographic Strength of LCGs

- Still, equations of the form $x_{i+1} = a \cdot x_i + N_i \cdot p$ can be solved using lattice reduction techniques, and therefore, we do not have strong assumptions of cryptographic strength
- There is also practical constraint in a LCG with all three parameters (*a*, *p*, *x*₀) are considered as the key
- We know that *p* has to be a prime and *a* has to be a primitive element of the group, that means a key generation algorithm has needs to incorporate these properties and generate such keys
- On the other hand, in a LCG with fixed parameters (a, p) we need not worry about key with special properties — the only key, the seed x₀, is just a random integer: any integer would be fine; also, since b = 0, the only "bad seed" is 0, and easy to avoid

GLIBC random()

- The GNU C library's random() function is a LCG with three steps
- The first step is based on the prime modulus $p = 2^{31} 1$ and the primitive element a = 16,807
- Given the seed value *s*, the first step computes 33 elements x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{33} :

$$x_0 = s$$

 $x_i = a \cdot x_{i-1} \pmod{p}$ for $i = 1, 2, ..., 30$
 $x_{31} = x_0$
 $x_{32} = x_1$
 $x_{33} = x_2$

GLIBC random()

- The second step is based on the addition operation mod $q = 2^{32}$
- In the second step, new x_i values are computed for $i = 34, 35, \ldots, 343$

$$x_i = x_{i-3} + x_{i-31} \pmod{q}$$
 for $i = 34, 35, \dots, 343$

• In the final step, the output values are generated using the previous mod q addition operation and the logical right shift operation $(\cdot)_{rs}$ as follows

$$x_i = x_{i-3} + x_{i-31} \pmod{q}$$
 for $i \ge 344$
 $r_j = (x_{j+344})_{r_s}$ for $i \ge 0$

• Inversion: Two consecutive different moduli and the right shift make the inversion more difficult, however, since there are 2³² different seed values, exhaustive search is possible