

Efficient On-board RSA Key Generation with Smart Cards

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Abstract— Public key cryptography gained increasing attention from both companies and the end users who wish to use this emerging technology to secularize a wide variety of applications. A major consequence of this trend has been the growing significance of the public-key smart cards. A smart card is a tiny secure cryptoprocessor embedded within a credit card-sized or smaller (like the GSM SIM) card which provide encryption, decryption as well as key generation within it's security perimeter. RSA is a simple and easy to implement public key cryptographic algorithm. Today RSA keys range from 512 bits to 2048 bits and some bodies envision 4096-bit RSA keys in near future. In this paper, I will present a study of efficient algorithms involved in on-board RSA key generation.

I. INTRODUCTION

It has been said that smart cards will one day be as important as computers are today. This statement contains a bit of an error because it implies that smart cards are not computers, when in fact, they are. A smart card - a type of chip card - is a plastic card embedded with a computer chip that stores and transacts data between users. This data is associated with either value or information or both and is stored and processed within the card's chip, either a memory or microprocessor. The card data is transacted via a reader that is part of a computing system. Smart card-enhanced systems are in use today throughout several key applications, including healthcare, banking, entertainment and transportation. To various degrees, all applications can benefit from the added features and security that smart cards provide. Because smart cards are indeed tiny computers, it's difficult to predict the variety of applications that will be possible with them in the future. It's quite possible that smart cards will follow the same trend of rapid increases in processing power that computers have, following "Moore's Law" and doubling in performance while halving in cost every eighteen months. Smart cards have proven to be quite useful as a transaction/authorization/identification medium in European countries. As their capabilities grow, they could become the ultimate thin client, eventually replacing all of the things we carry around in our wallets, including credit cards, licenses, cash, and even family photographs. (The photographs could be viewed and/or exchanged by capable terminals or personal computers.) By containing various identification certificates, smart cards could be used to voluntarily identify attributes of ourselves no matter where we are or to which computer network we are attached.

RSA was widely used by the manufacturers of the micro-controllers of smart cards. However, the computational power of smart cards is very limited and the on-card implementations are much slower than that on desktops. This paved a way to for high-end smart card controllers to have special hardware, called a crypto-coprocessor [1]. The crypto-coprocessor is a specialized circuitry that is able to perform fast modular exponentiation which inturn accelerates encryption and decryption of public key cryptographic algorithms that use the computing intensive modular exponentiation, like RSA. RSA key generation depends upon the efficient generation of prime numbers quick and correct. This paper describes some efficient prime generation algorithms and prime number testing algorithm that are relatively fast.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief introduction to RSA cryptosystem - RSA algorithm and RSA key generation. Section III highlights the prime number generation. This section also outlines various primality and compositeness tests. Prime generation algorithms are listed out in Section IV. Efficient prime number generation algorithms are described in this section. Section V talks about a new method of generating RSA keys - On-board key generation. An algorithm to describe the working of this key generation is mentioned. This paper is concluded with the acknowledgements and a conclusion finally.

II. RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM

RSA, named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, is the most widely deployed public-key cryptosystem. It is used for both public key encryption and digital signatures. The security of RSA relies on the integer factorization of integers.

A. RSA Algorithm

Two large primes p and q are chosen by the each individual user and the product $N = pq$ is published [2] . Next, each user chooses a public exponent e that is relatively prime to $(p - 1)$ and $(q - 1)$. Finally, each user computes the secret exponent d according to

$$ed \equiv (\text{mod}(\text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1)))$$

The public parameters are (N, e) while the secret parameters are (p, q, d) . To send a message M to Bob, Alice locates Bob's name in the directory and obtains his public key (e, N)

and computes the cipher text $C = M^e \pmod{N}$. Next, to recover the plain text M , Bob uses his private exponent and the modulus, and computes $M = C^e \pmod{N}$. RSA algorithm provides a procedure for signing a digital document, and verifying whether the signature is indeed authentic. A digital signature cannot be a constant; it is a function of the document for which it was produced. Suppose Alice wants to sign a message, and Bob would like to obtain a proof that this message is indeed signed by Alice. Alice takes the message M , uses her secret key and computes $S = M^d \pmod{N}$. Next, she sends M and S to Bob. Then Bob can verify that S corresponds to Alice's signature on the message M by checking whether $S^e \pmod{N} \equiv M$ where e is the public exponent of Alice. Otherwise, either the original message M or the signature S is modified, thus, the signature is not valid.

B. RSA Key Generation

As mentioned in the above section, RSA keys is a pair of matching public/private keys. RSA uses a key for encryption that is different from the decryption key. The key generation requires two primes p and q so that

- (i) $(p-1)$ and $(q-1)$ are co-prime to public component e and
- (ii) $N = pq$ is exactly an l bit integer, where l is the bit length of N .

The drawback in this approach is the running time which is the most expensive operation in generating these keys. Another solution consists in pre-computing values for p and q for various pairs (e, l) and to store those values in a non-volatile memory of crypto-coprocessor. Non-volatile memory is the drawback here as it is more expensive. Using very efficient algorithms, 1024 bit modulus N along with d can be generated in few seconds on current smart cards.

III. PRIME NUMBER GENERATION

The generation of prime numbers underlies the use of the most public-key schemes, essentially as a major primitive needed for the creation of key pairs or as a computation stage appearing during various cryptographic setups. Despite decades of intense mathematical studies on primality testing and an observed progressive intensification of cryptographic usages, prime number generation algorithms remain scarcely investigated. Common generators typically require $O(n^4)$ or $O(n^4/\log n)$ bit operations where n is the bit-length of the expected prime number [3]. Thus, there is a need for algorithms that substantially reduce the value of the hidden constants, therefore providing much more efficient prime generation algorithms. It is also necessary to optimize the performance of the algorithm used for finding large primes in order to optimize the performance of the algorithm for generating the RSA key pair [3]. For RSA, it is very important to choose prime numbers p and q forming the modulus $N = pq$ randomly and as large as possible. RSA based on the difficulty to factorize the modulus n also means that someone will not be able to infer the primes p and q by another way than the factorization.

A. Primality and Compositeness Tests

Primality tests declare whether a number is prime with probability with 1. Sieve of Eratosthenes and Modular Search

Method fall in this category. Compositeness test declares whether a number is composite with a probability 1 or prime with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Fermat test, Solovay-Strassen test and Miller-Rabin test fall under this category. Sieve of Eratosthenes was the first known means to test for primality and to factorize numbers. It simply verifies the divisibility of the number n to test by all the primes starting from 2 to \sqrt{n} . It is practically unthinkable to use this kind of algorithm for generating primes as large as the ones used in RSA key generation. Modular Search Method has excellent execution time when using an arithmetic process but the memory space needed to store the numbers appears dissuasive, in particular on smart cards where memory is subjected to strong size constraint.

Compositeness test also called probabilistic primality tests seems to be much faster than primality tests. A number is a prime number with a high probability if it passes a probabilistic primality certain number of times. In the next section, we will see many different prime generation algorithms. To improve the speed of generating large prime numbers it is possible to use some properties of numbers to build probabilistic tests such that all prime numbers pass the tests and the other ones pass with a probability x .

B. Fermat Test

The (little) fermat theorem says that $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, for every prime n and base a relatively prime with n . Hence the algorithm for the test goes like this

- 1: for $i = 1$ to t
- 2: Choose randomly a with $2 \leq a \leq n - 2$
- 3: $r = a^{n-1} \pmod{n}$
- 4: if $r \neq 1$ return composite
- 5: endfor
- 6: return n prime

There exist composite numbers n always passing Fermat's pseudo-primality test called Carmichael Numbers [4].

C. Solovay-Strassen Test

The test is a further improvement of Fermat's test.

$$a^{(n-1)/2} \equiv (a/n) \pmod{n}$$

where (a/n) is Jacobi Symbol. The probability for a composite number to pass this test is less than $1/2^t$ if t is the number of randomly chosen base a [4].

D. Miller-Rabin Test

Miller-Rabin test is further more simple and easy to implement test than the previous ones. This is a primality test that provides an efficient probabilistic algorithm for determining if a given number is prime. It is based on the properties of strong pseudoprimes. The algorithm proceeds as follows. Given an odd integer n , let $n = 2^r s + 1$ with s odd. Then choose a random integer a with $1 \leq a \leq n - 1$. If $a^s \equiv 1$ or $a^{2^j s} \equiv -1 \pmod{n}$ for some $0 \leq j \leq r - 1$, then n passes the test. A prime will pass the test for all a . The test is very

fast and requires no more than $(1 + o(1)) \log n$ multiplications (mod n), where \log is the logarithm base 2. Unfortunately, a number which passes the test is not necessarily prime. Monier and Rabin have shown that a composite number passes the test for at most $1/4$ of the possible bases a . If N multiple independent tests are performed on a composite number, then the probability that it passes each test is $1/4^N$ or less [4]. The algorithm (n odd) is shown below.

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1: find  $t$  and  $q$  such that  $n = 2^t q + 1$ 
2: for  $i = 1$  to  $t$ 
3: choose randomly  $a$  with  $2 \leq a \leq n - 2$ 
4:  $x = a^q \bmod n$ 
5: if  $(x \neq 1)$ 
6:    $i = i + 1$ 
7:   while  $(x \neq n - 1)$  do
8:     if  $(i = t)$  return composite
9:      $x = x^2 \bmod n$ 
10:  if  $(x = 1)$  return composite
11:   $i = i + 1$ 
12: endwhile
13: endif
14: endfor
15: return  $n$  pseudo-prime

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E. Primality testing with Elliptic Curves

Let n be a suspected prime. If it is really a prime, then $|E(a, b)/n|$ lies in the interval $(n + 1 - 2\sqrt{n}, n + 1 + 2\sqrt{n})$. Furthermore, it is known that if n is prime, then there are always many elements of high order. If we can factor $|E(a, b)/n|$, say $|E(a, b)/n| = q_1^{a_1} \dots q_r^{a_r}$, then we choose a point $P = (X_0, Y_0, Z_0)$ at random and find its order. The order must be divisor of $|E(a, b)/n|$ and hence we can start by verifying $P \# (|E(a, b)/n|/q_i)$ for each i . If then Z coordinate is relatively prime to n for each i and if n divides the Z coordinate of $P \# |E(a, b)/n|$, then the order of P in $E(a, b)/p$ is $|E(a, b)/n| \geq n + 1 - 2\sqrt{n}$ for any prime p dividing n which implies that n is prime. There is still hope even if one or more of the Z coordinates is divisible by n . For each such i , we find the smallest positive integer b_i , such that the Z coordinate of

$$P \# \left(\frac{|E(a, b)/n|}{q_i^{b_i}} \right)$$

is relatively prime to n .

IV. PRIME GENERATION ALGORITHMS

1) *Generating RSA Primes*: This is a simple algorithmic outline to generate RSA primes. 1. Pick a k bit odd m uniformly at random from $[m/2, m]$ 2. Apply test division on m by all primes less than a certain small prime 3. If m passes trial division test, then apply the (strong) pseudoprimalty test for r different bases 2, 3, 5, 7... 4. If m passes all r (strong) pseudoprimalty tests, then m is a prime number with high probability 5. If m fails, take $m := m + 2$ goto Step 2

2) *Naive prime finding algorithm*: The naive prime generation algorithm is sketched in the following table. Neglecting calls to the random number generator, the expected number of trials here is asymptotically equal to $(\ln 2^n / 2)$. 89 trials are required to generate a 256 prime number. A naive approach to find an n bit prime number is to randomly choose a b bit odd number and call a compositeness test function f using the odd number as input. If the function f returns the result that the number is not a prime, another random number is chosen and the procedure of testing it with a function is repeated until a prime number is found, which would be the prime used for key generation. Hence, the implementation of the primality test function f must be optimized and the numbers of tests (number of calls to f) should be minimum in order to optimize the performance of the prime finding algorithm [3]. Table 1 below describes the algorithm clearly. The $T(q)$ function mentioned in the algorithm is nothing but the test of primality.

Table:1 Naive Prime Finding Algorithm

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. pick a random $n - \text{bit}$ odd number q 2. if $T(q) = \text{false}$ then goto 1 3. output q
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3) *Sieve of Eratosthenes*: The sieve of Eratosthenes was the first known means to test for primality and to factorize numbers. It verifies the divisibility of the number n to test by all primes starting from 2 to \sqrt{n} . It is very fast with the first small primes but its computation time essentially grows linearly with n . Sieve is always used to rapidly eliminate the randomly chosen prime candidates having very small factors. The function $Q(x)$ where P_x is the set of all primes $\leq x$ may be defined as $Q(x) = \prod_{p \in P_x} (1 - 1/p)$ [5]. For a n larger than x , this function may be interpreted as the probability for n to be relatively prime with all primes in P_x . Practically, a sieve can be implemented by evaluating the GCD of the product all the elements of P_x with the number n to test. Table 2 lists out the algorithm for this test. The function $S(k)$ is the set of prime numbers.

Table:2 Sieve of Eratosthenes

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Let p_i be the $i - \text{th}$ smallest odd prime ($p_1=3, p_2=5, \dots$) 2. Let $S(k)$ be a set of prime small prime such that $S(k) = (p_i p_i \leq k, i \in N)$, where k can be any positive integer. 3. For a given number q, divide q by all the elements in $S(k)$ 4. If q is not divisible by all the elements in $S(k)$, q is said to survive the sieve. Otherwise q is said to fail the sieve i.e q is a composite number.

4) *Prime finding algorithm using trial division*: One of the most used sieve methods is the trial division method. If we are given an integer less than a million, we can find its prime factors fairly quickly just by using the fact that if it is not a prime, then it must have a factor less than its square root. Thus, take a list of all primes and try dividing them into the

number to be factored. If none of them divide evenly, then the original number was prime. Each time we find a prime divisor, we divide it out. Once the unfactored portion that remains is less than the square of the last prime tested, it can be known that the unfactored portion has to be prime [5]. The algorithm is described in the Table.3.

Table:3 Prime finding algorithm using trial division

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Choose a set $S(k)$. Pick a $n - bit$ odd random number q and let $q_{(0)}=q, i=0$ 2. Let $w_{(j)}^i=q^{(i)} \bmod p_j$.
If $w_{(j)}^i = 0$, for any j,
$1 \leq j \leq k$, goto 4 3. If $T(q^{(i)})=TRUE$, output q^i and halt. 4. $q^{i+1}=q^i+2, i := i + 1$, goto 2 |
|---|

5) *Prime finding algorithm using table look-up*: The modular reductions are very expensive. Hence, it is desirable to keep the number of modular reduction operations on the sieve procedure to minimum. The modular reduction in trial division algorithm is shown in Table 3. Although modular reduction can be used to compute w_j^i , there is an efficient way to improve it. If $q_{i+1}=q_i+2$ and $w_j^i=q_i \bmod p$, then $w_j^{i+1}=w_j^i+2 \bmod p$. Finally, one can calculate w_j^{i+1} from w_j^i . In addition, if p_j is assumed to be 8-bits long, so is w_j^i . So the computation of w_j^{i+1} only uses two 8-bit operands, resulting in a performance much faster than modular reduction operations. The algorithm is described in Table 4 [5].

Table:4 Prime finding algorithm using table look-up

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Choose a set $S(k)$. Pick a $n - bit$ odd random number q and let $q_{(0)}=q, i=0$ 2. Compute $w_{(j)}^0=q^{(0)} \bmod p_j, 1 \leq j \leq k$ 3. If $w_{(j)}^i=0$, for any $j, 1 \leq j \leq k$, goto 5 4. If $T(q^{(i)})=TRUE$, output q^i and halt 5. $w_{(j)}^{i+1} = w_{(j)}^i + 2 \bmod p_j, 1 \leq j \leq k$ 6. $q^{(i+1)}=q^{(i)}+2, i=i+1$, goto 3 |
|--|

The algorithm requires a table $[w_1, w_2, \dots]$ to keep all the residues w_j^i of the previous iteration. Hence, this algorithm is referred to as table look-up algorithm.

6) *Prime finding algorithm using bit array*: Let us consider the interval of l test candidates, say $q^{(0)}, q^{(1)}, \dots, q^{(i-1)}$. A bit array A is defined as $[a_0 a_1 \dots a_{i-1}]$ where a_i is the $i - th$ bit, initially set to 0 with a_i representing the number $q^{(i)}$. For each prime p from the set $S(k)$, we find a starting point $g(p) = \min(i | q^i \bmod p = 0)$ is divisible by $p, i \in N$. If $g(p)$ is less than l , set $a_{i(p)}$ to 1 and then every $p - th$ bit of A is set to 1 since the values of a that are represented by these bits would also be divisible by p . After this sieve, a_i is zero if and only if $q^{(i)}$ is not divisible by any of the numbers in $S(k)$. The sieve is then concluded and the prime finding algorithm must only scan the bit array A and try the primality test T for each $q^{(i)}$ such that a_i is zero. This algorithm is called bit array algorithm. The bit array algorithm will find a probable prime if there is one in the chosen interval. In the case that there is no probable prime on the chosen interval, one can either randomly choose

another odd q and let $q^{(0)} = q^{(i-1)} + 2$. Table 5 describes the algorithm [5].

Table:5 Prime finding algorithm using bit array

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|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Set $a_i = 0$, for $0 \leq i \leq l - 1$ 2. Pick a $n - bit$ odd random number q and let $q_{(0)}=q, i=0$ 3. For each $p_j \in S(k)$, do <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3.1 Compute $w_j^0=q^{(0)} \bmod p_j$ 3.2 Compute $g(p_j)$ 3.3 Set $a_{g(p_j)+m} = 1, 0 \leq m \leq [(l - g(p_j))/p_j]$ 4. for $i:=0$ to $l - 1$, do <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4.1 If $(a_i=0)$ and $T(q^{(i)})= true$, output $q^{(i)}$ and halt. 4.2 $q^{(i+1)}=q^{(i)}+2$ 4.3 $q^{(0)}=q^{(i)}, i=0$, goto 3 |
|--|

V. ONBOARD GENERATION

Onboard key generation is preferable as the keys are not imposed by the card manufacturer. This is a new method suggested by FJ[1] for the generation of RSA keys. This algorithm is divided into two phases. The first phase is performed offline before the values of (l, e) are even known. The second phase is performed online by the cryptographic device once (l, e) are known. This method is supposed to be very fast when compared any other method of RSA key generation [6].

Table:6 Onboard RSA prime generation algorithm

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|--|
| Input: parameters l_0, e and a (of large order) in Z_π^*
Output: a prime q in $[2^{l_0-1/2}, 2^{l_0} - 1]$ |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Compute $v = \lceil \frac{[2^{l_0-1/2}]}{\pi} \rceil$ and $w = \lfloor \frac{2^{l_0}}{\pi} \rfloor$ 2. randomly choose $j \in R v, \dots, w - 1$ and set $l \leftarrow j\pi$ 3. randomly choose $k \in R Z_\pi^*$ 4. Set $q \leftarrow k + l$ 5. If $(q$ is not prime) or $(gcd(e, q - 1) \neq 1)$ then <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5.1 Set $kak \pmod{\pi}$ 5.2 Goto step 4 6. Output q |

The prime produced by this algorithm has the form of $q = a^{f-1}k_{(0)} \bmod \pi + j\pi$ where $k_{(0)}$ denotes the initial value of k and f is the number of failures of the test in Step 5 [7]. Memory requirements are reduced radically if l_0 bit prime q can be stored as a pair (i, f) where i is a unique indexed identifier (i is used as the input of a pseudo random number generator for constructing $v, w, j, k_{(0)}$). This phase is performed offline. Then the online stage consists in reconstructing primes from pairs (i, f) . Moreover, in addition to be a fast, this method allows the online generation of RSA moduli $N = pq$ of arbitrary length from a very small set of values computed at the offline phase. Furthermore, parameters can be chosen so that keys are guaranteed to work for the usual public exponent e which is usually let at the discretion of the end user [7].

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VII. CONCLUSION

A basis for understanding the key generation on smart cards is presented in this paper. Time constraint in generating RSA keys on smart cards is clearly pointed and algorithms that can optimize the amount of time required to generate the keys on smart cards are highlighted. Most of these algorithms are implemented with varying results. There are several factors that must be taken into account when designing cryptographic algorithms for smart cards. There are several other algorithms that can efficiently generate RSA key pairs but they couldn't overcome the specified constraint on the smart cards. At present, a cheaper but effective solution may be to have an on-board key generation. So, sets of keys will be generated only if they will be used. Furthermore, there is more memory available and this method is more secure as private keys are only owned by the end user. Recent study shows that on-board generation takes few seconds on an average. Larger key sizes present new challenges since smart card crypto coprocessor have fixed register sizes that will not be able to accommodate large numbers. Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC) can provide the same level of security using smaller RSA key lengths. A future work would be the designing of key generation algorithms using the Elliptic Curve Cryptography.

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