

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm for Elliptic Curves

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# Pollard's Rho Algorithm

Consider the elliptic curve  $E$  over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^k}$ , where  $|E| = n$ .


Assume we want to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem: find  $k$  in  $Q = kP$ .

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm

- ▶ Partition  $E$  into  $S_1 \cup S_2 \cup S_3$ , where the  $S_i$  are similar in size.
- ▶ Choose  $A_i \in E$  as some scalar multiple of  $P$ .

- ▶ Let  $A_{i+1} = f(A_i) = \begin{cases} A_i + P, & A_i \in S_1, \\ 2A_i, & A_i \in S_2, \\ A_i + Q, & A_i \in S_3. \end{cases}$

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm



► Image credit: Washington [1]

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm

The terms of the sequence then take the form  $A_i = a_j P + b_j Q$ .

Once we see an equality  $A_{i_1} = A_{i_2}$ , we have

$$a_{j_1} P + b_{j_1} Q = a_{j_2} P + b_{j_2} Q,$$

which means that

$$\frac{a_{j_1} - a_{j_2}}{b_{j_2} - b_{j_1}} P = Q.$$

The ECDLP can thus be solved provided that  $\gcd(b_{j_2} - b_{j_1}, n) = 1$ .

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm

- ▶ In fact, even if  $\gcd(b_{j_2} - b_{j_1}, n) = d > 1$ , we can compute

$$\frac{a_{j_1} - a_{j_2}}{b_{j_2} - b_{j_1}} \pmod{N/d}.$$

- ▶ There are then  $d$  possibilities for  $k$ , which is only intractable for large  $d$ .
- ▶ In practice, however,  $d$  is quite small, especially if  $E$  is chosen so that  $n$  is prime.

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm

Unlike Baby-Step Giant-Step, only  $O(1)$  space complexity is required:

Start with the ordered pair  $(A_1, A_2)$ . Given  $(A_i, A_{2i})$ , we can compute  $(A_{i+1}, A_{2i+2}) = (f(A_i), f(f(A_{2i})))$ .

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm

Why does this find a match?

- ▶ Suppose  $A_i = A_j$ . Then  $A_{i+k} = A_{j+k}$  for all  $k \geq 0$ .
- ▶ For  $k = j - 2i (\geq 0)$ , we have  $A_{i+j-2i} = A_{j+j-2i}$ , or  $A_{j-i} = A_{2(j-i)}$ .
- ▶ Note that  $j - i \geq i$  by construction since  $j \geq 2i$ .



# Performance Issues

- ▶ However, it turns out that this function  $f$  performs approximately 33% more slowly than the expectation.
- ▶ It can be shown that the tail and cycle length both have an expectation of  $\sqrt{\pi n/8}$ .
- ▶ Therefore, a cycle should be detected within  $2\sqrt{\pi n/8} = \sqrt{\pi n/2}$  iterations.

# Increasing Number of Partition Elements

- ▶ Research has indicated that using more than 3 partition elements improves the randomness of the function  $f$ .
- ▶ This improves the performance of the algorithm.

## Increasing Number of Partition Elements

In order to do this, we can hash the points  $(x, y) \in E$  to the set  $\{1, \dots, m\}$ .

- ▶ It turns out hashing based on the  $x$ -coordinate is just as effective as using the  $y$ -coordinate.
- ▶ Since the  $x$ -coordinate is a polynomial, we can represent it as a binary vector and view it as an integer for the purposes of hashing.
- ▶ We then partition evenly into  $m$  subsets of size  $\frac{2^k}{m}$ .

# Increasing Number of Partition Elements

- ▶ We define  $M_j = a_jP + b_jQ$ , where the  $a_j$ 's and  $b_j$ 's are randomly chosen modulo  $n$ .
- ▶ We then define  $f(A_i) = A_i + M_j$  when  $A_i \in S_j$ .




## Increasing Number of Partition Elements

- ▶ The best choice for  $m$  in simulating a random function  $f$  seems to be in the range  $[20, 30]$ .
- ▶ However, there is evidence that for  $m$  around 60, the function  $f$  performs more efficiently than a random map by about 6%.

# Future Work

- ▶ Collect statistics for curves over larger binary fields (the data gathered was for curves over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ ).
- ▶ Perform similar analysis for curves over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ .

# References

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-  P. Flajolet and A. Odlyzko, Random Mapping Statistics. In *Advanced in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT '89 (Houthalen, 1989)*, volume 434 of *Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci.*, pages 329-354. Springer, Berlin, 1990.
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